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I. Introduction
For most of this century, the United States actively promoted
the flow of art into this country. This flow of art made it possible for
museums such as New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art and
Washington's National Gallery of Art eventually to assume their
places among the ranking artistic treasure houses of the world. The
prevailing attitude toward the importation of art was reflected in the
general rule that it was not illegal to import art into the United
States simply because it had been exported from another country in
violation of its laws.
Attitudes toward the importation of art into the United States
began to shift in the 1970's when the new-found popularity of pre-
Columbian antiquities' led to a widespread and well-publicized dep-
redation of Mayan archaeological sites. In an attempt to help rem-
edy this situation, Congress enacted in 1972 a law on the
"Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental and Architectural
Sculpture or Murals2 ("The Pre-Columbian Monuments Act"). This
legislation was intended to help deter the despoliation of pre-Colum-
bian sites in Central America by drying up the market in the United
States for a limited class of pre-Columbian antiquities. A further
departure from traditional attitudes was reflected by the actions of
the United States Customs Service later in the 1970's, when, among
other things, it seized upon minor and technical infractions of the
United States Customs law in an effort to halt the importation of art
thought to have been illegally exported from its country of origin.
Publicity with respect to the havoc being visited on Mayan sites
must also have colored the decisions in United States v. McClain3 in
1977 (McClain I) and its companion case in 19794 (McClain I), de-
cisions which signaled an abrupt, and to some, a disturbing reversal
of what had hitherto been United States policy with respect to the
flow of art into the United States. These cases held that under cer-
tain circumstances the National Stolen Property Act5 (NSPA) might
be triggered by the importation into the United States - or subse-
quent dealing in - works of art illegally removed from foreign na-
tions. In effect, the decisions meant that, with proper legislative
1. See note 23 infra
2. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-587, 86 Stat. 1297 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-
2095) (1976).
3. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
4. United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2318 (1976).
wording, a foreign nation could convert an infraction of its own ex-
port restrictions into a criminal violation of a United States statute.
The McClain cases seem to have handed art-exporting nations a
"blank check" to create crimes in the United States, precisely the
result which the United States fought long and hard to avoid in the
deliberations that gave rise to the UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Cultural Property6 (UNESCO Convention). A legisla-
tive implementation of this treaty, which might provide a sensible
solution to the problems raised by the McClain cases, however, has
itself become mired in controversy.
This article will review and assess these recent legislative, regu-
latory and judicial developments and will consider their impact on
art dealers, museum officials, and the public. In addition, it will ex-
plore the problems involved in fashioning appropriate implementing
legislation for the UNESCO Convention.
II. Historical Background
"Acquisition . . . acquisition if need be on the highest terms
• . . may, during the years to come, bask here as in a climate it has
never before enjoyed."7 So wrote Henry James in 1907 concerning
New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art, but his words reflected a
vision of the future that encompassed the entire nation. As he saw it,
"There was money in the air, ever so much money. . . . And the
money was to be all for the most exquisite things ... "8
The United States was rich at the turn of the century, and it was
generally thought to be right and proper that art should flow to this
country as in the past it had flowed to England at the height of its
power or to France when that country ruled supreme. It was consid-
ered part and parcel of this country's manifest destiny that the great
art of the past should now come to its shores as an ornament of its
culture and for the edification and enjoyment of its citizenry.
And so it did. In 1909 Congress passed the Payne-Aldrich
Tariff Act, which abolished import duties on works of art that were
more than twenty years old.9 J. Pierpont Morgan promptly set about
6. Gen'l Conf. of UNESCO, Nov. 14, 1970, reprinted in 10 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS
289 (1971) (hereinafter cited as "UNESCO Convention" or "the Convention"). UNESCO
stands for "United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization." See note 138
7. H. JAMES, THE AMERICAN SCENE 192 (1907).
8. Id
9. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 81-82. During the Senate debate
on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, Senator Root observed:
No step can be taken to advance more rapidly the building up of these great agencies
for education in taste, for cultivation, for enlarging the capacity of happiness, than
the measure which is now before us, for it affords the greatest opportunity for bring-
ing into the museums of the country the best of all the art of the world.
42 CONG. REC. 3170 (1909).
packing for shipment to the United States some 351 cases of art that
he had previously stored in London; I0 and one of the golden ages of
collecting was ushered in.
New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art flourished, initially
under the aegis of Morgan, who scoured Europe for old masters with
the zest and swagger of a Medici prince, and also under the pa-
tronage of such collectors as Benjamin Altman and H.O.
Havemayer. " In the meantime, Isabella Stewart Gardner was amas-
sing the collection that was to be housed in Fenway Court in Boston,
now the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum;' 2 H.E. Huntington was
buying Gainsborough's Blue Boy 13 and Lawrence's Pinkie ' 4 for what
was to become the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery in
San Marino, California; 5 and Henry Clay Frick was filling whole
rooms of his New York mansion with Fragonards'
6 and Bouchers 17
for the beginning of the Frick Collection.'" Andrew W. Mellon,
P.A.B. Widener, Joseph Widener, and Samuel Kress were also busy
buying art. The paintings and sculpture that they acquired later
formed the foundation for the collection of the National Gallery of
Art in Washington, D.C. 9
The country was proud of its growing art collections, and
neither Congress nor the courts showed any inclination to erect bar-
riers to the importation of art into the United States. The fundamen-
tal rule of law in America, as in almost all other art-importing
nations, was that it was not illegal to import a work of art into this
country simply because the work had been illegally exported from
another country.20 Perhaps artworks left Europe or elsewhere in vio-
10. C. TOMKINS, MERCHANTS AND MASTERPIECES, THE STORY OF THE METROPOLITAN
MUSEUM OF ART 176-77 (1970).
11. Id at 95-100, 169-74, 207-10.
12. S. BEHRMAN, DUVEEN 87-89 (1957).
13. Thomas Gainsborough (1727-1788) was a versatile and original English painter of
landscapes and portraits.
14. Sir Thomas Lawrence (1769-1830), a fashionable English portrait painter and presi-
dent of the Royal Academy, painted his distinguished subjects in a style characterized by a
superficial elegance and a facile use of color.
15. S. BEHRMAN, DUVEEN 18-20, 111-20 (1957).
16. Jean-Honore Fragonard (1732-1806) was a leading French artist in the Rococo style.
Fragonard's work is characterized by a delicate hedonism applied to his favorite subjects -
landscapes and portraits.
17. Francois Boucher (1703-1770), painter, engraver and designer, exemplified French
taste in the Rococo period. Boucher was influenced by Rubens and Watteau. His work is
rioted for his use of color, gently modeled forms, facile technique and frivolous subject matter.
Boucher taught Fragonard and the King's mistress, Madame de Pompadour.
18. S. BEHRMAN, DUVEEN 130-33.
19. D. FINLEY, A STANDARD OF EXCELLENCE 19-53, 77-107 (1973). See also A.
SAARINEN, THE PROUD POSSESSORS (1958) for a chronicle of some of these collectors and their
contemporaries.
20. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 n.13 (5th Cir. 1977), citing Bator, Inter-
national Trade in NationalArt Treasures.- Regulation and Deregulation, in DuBOFF, ART LAW,
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 295, 300 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975).
lation of a country's export restrictions, but the United States was
not about to police the laws of other nations, much less laws
designed to prevent a free flow of art to the United States. This pol-
icy reflected a climate of public opinion that encouraged the impor-
tation of art. This favorable climate began to change only in the
early 1970's.
In earlier eras, it had generally been possible to satisfy the
desires of collectors and museums without substantial damage to art
itself. True, there was the incident of Lord Elgin and the removal of
the sculpture from the Parthenon, but it was never entirely clear
whether Lord Elgin was despoiling the Parthenon or rescuing the
marbles. In addition, altar pieces were often dismembered, and re-
lated panels of triptychs and diptychs were dispersed to different col-
lections, but this was probably as much due to the vicissitudes of war
and the vagaries of changing taste as it was to the cupidity of collec-
tors. 21 Moreover, the dispersal of related works of art, while lamen-
table, was not equivalent to physical destruction.
Some cases of actual physical mutilation did exist, as in the case
of the Buddhas at sites in China that were deliberately decapitated
or dismembered so that the sculptural fragments could be hawked to
tourists or sold to foreign museums, 22 but prior to the 1970's this
depredation received little public attention and aroused little indig-
nation.
III. The Pre-McClain Restrictions
A. The Pre-Columbian Monuments Act
The popularity of pre-Columbian art23 changed the situation.
21. See Failing, The Case of the Dismembered Masterpieces, 79 ART NEWS 68 (1980).
22. Topping, China's Hidden CaveArt, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1979, § 6 (Magazine) at 27,
29 & 68. The writer notes:
Before 1949, foreigners who managed to reach the [Buddhist temple] caves
marked the statues or parts they wanted with chalk, then arranged - often with the
Chinese caretakers - to chop the statue parts off and sell them. According to a 1930
Shanghai newspaper, the Yungang caves lost more than 90 pieces of sculpture this
way. Nearly all, it stated, were sold to "foreign learned societies." (Most of them are
now in European, Japanese or American museums.)
At the time, foreign buyers felt no guilt about buying the pieces because the sales
were transacted with full knowledge of the Chinese Nationalist Government. In fact,
many collectors felt they were rescuing neglected objects by sending them to places
where they could be preserved, appreciated and marveled at by art lovers the world
over.
Id at 29, 68.
23. Throughout the early part of this century, the focus of collecting both by private
collectors and by museums was primarily on Western art, ranging from Greek vases and Ro-
man marbles to the paintings of the impressionists. Secondarily, the focus was on the ancient
art of Egypt and the Near East and the arts of the Far East, India and Southeast Asia. For the
most part, so-called "primitive" art - the art of pre-Columbian America, Oceania and sub-
Saharan Africa - was relegated to the museums of natural history. African art enjoyed a
somewhat earlier vogue. Newton et al., The Stuff That Wasn 't in the Metropolitan.- Notes on
Collecting Primitive Art in THE CHASE, THE CAPTURE: COLLECTING AT THE METROPOLITAN
The demand for Mayan stone carvings led to a systematic looting of
Mayan sites, and in the early 1970's the American public became
aware that some of the Mayan carvings displayed in United States
museums and private collections had been obtained only at the cost
of the widespread mutilation of these important works of art.
Archaeologist Ian Graham 4 was among the first to alert the
public to what was happening in the jungle lowlands of Guatemala.
As part of a project to inventory Mayan inscriptions, Graham visited
remote Mayan sites in the Pet6n. His assignment was to photograph
the glyphs, which together with human and other figures, are carved
into the ceremonial stone slabs referred to as "stelae." These mas-
sive stelae represent one of the most important forms of Mayan art.
As time went on, Graham found that the stelae that he was studying
were being uprooted or ravaged at an alarming rate.25
In March 1971, Graham visited a recently looted site to assess
the damage. His party was ambushed at nightfall, and Graham's
Guatamalan guide, who had previously helped police identify sev-
eral looters, was shot and killed.26 Against this grim background, a
special panel was formed in 1972 by the American Society of Inter-
national Law27 to study the depredation of Mayan sites and develop
recommendations. The panel, which included representatives of
museums and art dealers, 28 recommended to the United States Sec-
retary of State the legislation that was subsequently enacted by Con-
190-94 (1975). But the first major exhibition of pre-Columbian art in the United States oc-
curred at the Museum of Modem Art in 1933, id at 189, and it was only in the early to mid-
1950's that the market for pre-Columbian art began to flourish in this country. Letter from
Andr6 Emmerich to James R. McAlee (Jan. 27, 1981).
Mr. Emmerich was one of the first dealers in pre-Columbian art in the United States and
is the author of ART BEFORE COLUMBUS (1963) and SWEAT OF THE SUN AND TEARS OF THE
MOON (1965). In his letter, Mr. Emmerich notes that the term "pre-Columbian" was not even
in general usage before the 1950's and that there was no general introduction to pre-Colum-
bian art available to the interested layman until the publication in 1957 of M. Covarrubia's
INDIAN ART OF MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA (1957).
24. Ian Graham (1923- ) archaeologist and author, is currently Assistant Curator,
Peabody Museum of Archaeology, Harvard University.
25. K. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST 29-33 (1973). In some cases, the estelero, or loot-
ers, sawed off the carved fronts of stelae to avoid carrying the full weight of the monuments
out of the jungle. In other cases, they simply smashed the stelae into fragments. Coggins,
Archaeology and the Art Market, 175 SCIENCE 263-64 (1972); K. MEYER, THE MAYA CRISIS
15-17 (1972). Meyer lists some 21 plundered Mayan sites in the Pet6n. Id at 35-37.
26. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST, supra note 25, at 31-32.
27. The American Society of International Law founded in 1906, is devoted to promoting
international relations based on law and justice and publishes a wide range of international
legal materials.
28. S. Rep. No. 92-1221, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972).
Stela 16, Late Classic, c. A.D. 711, Tikal, Guatemala.
Photograph courtesy of the University Museum, University of Penn-
sylvania.
Stela 22 (with Altar 10), late Classic, c. A.D. 771, Tikal, Guatemala.
Photograph courtesy of the University Museum, University of Penn-
sylvania.
Stela 29 as found. Looters had sawn the shaft into blocks as a pre-
liminary to sawing off the carved front surface. El Peru, Guatemala.
Photograph courtesy of Ian Graham.
gress in 1972 as the Pre-Columbian Monuments Act.29
In an attempt to remedy the problem at hand, the Pre-Colum-
bian Monuments Act authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, after
consultation with the Secretary of State, to promulgate a descriptive
list of pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture or
murals.30 The Act provided that such material could not be im-
ported into the United States after the effective date of the regulation
in which it was described unless the government of its country of
origin issued a certificate that such exportation did not violate its
laws. If a consignee of pre-Columbian art was unable to present to
the United States Custom Service either a certificate of the country
of origin, or satisfactory evidence that the art was exported from its
country of origin before the effective date of the listing regulation, or
satisfactory evidence that the art was not covered by the regulation,
the Customs authorities were directed to seize the material for return
to its country of origin.
The statute was clearly intended to apply only to a narrow class
of archaeological objects.3 The term "pre-Columbian monumental
or architectural sculpture or mural" is defined in the Pre-Columbian
Monuments Act as follows:
(A) any stone carving or wall art which -
(i) is the product of a pre-Columbian Indian culture of Mex-
ico, Central America, South America, or the Caribbean Islands;
(ii) was an immobile monument or architectural structure or
was a part of, or affixed to, any such monument or structure; and
(iii) is subject to export control by the countr of origin; or
(B) any fragment or part of any stone carving or wall art described
in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.32
The regulations33 promulgated under the Pre-Columbian Act,
were, however, broader than the legislative background of the Act
might have suggested. In the first place, the regulations covered pre-
Columbian art not only from the nations in which the endangered
Mayan stelae were located, but also from Bolivia, Columbia, Costa
29. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-587, 86 Stat. 1297 (codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-
2095) (1976).
The Senate Finance Committee described the situation that gave rise to the legislation as
follows:
The Committee is informed that the ceremonial centers and architectural com-
plexes of the ancient civilizations of Latin America are being pillaged and mutilated
in order to meet the demands of a flourishing international market for pre-Colum-
bian art objects. Frequently, art objects taken from these centers and complexes are
broken into pieces and otherwise seriously damaged for the convenience of the loot-
ers who export the fragments from the country of origin for sale to collectors and
cultural institutions.
S. Rep. No. 92-1221, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972).
30. As defined in § 2095(3) of the Act. See note 32 and accompanying text .infra
31. S. Rep. No. 92-1221, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 2095(3) (1976).
33. Effective June I, 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,807 (1973).
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru
and Venezuela. 34 The rulemakers apparently found it awkward to
discriminate among the Latin American nations in the application of
the Pre-Columbian Monuments Act, despite the fact that some of
those countries have no monumental pre-Columbian sculpture or
murals that could possibly be regarded as imperiled by looting.
35
Moreover, the regulations attempted to expand the categories of
art covered by the statute. They purported to cover not only monu-
mental and architectural sculpture but also more grandly - "basins,
calendars, cylindrical markers, columns, monoliths, obelisks, statues,
stelae, sarcophagi, thrones, zoomorphs."36 The fact that the regula-
tions referred to any pre-Columbian "statue" of any size whatsoever
evidenced an almost jaunty disregard for the express terms of the
legislation.37 While this disregard can presumably be remedied in
court, the attitude of the draftsmen of the regulations cannot so eas-
ily be corrected. If nothing more, the expansiveness of the regula-
tions serves as a warning that restrictive import regulations may be
implemented with greater zeal than discrimination.
Whatever their defects in draftsmanship, the regulations were
successful in halting the importation of pre-Columbian monumental
and architectural sculpture and murals into the United States. They
did nothing, however, to deter the flow of such art to European and
Japanese collectors and did little to alleviate the destruction of Ma-
yan monuments. Yet, in retrospect the Act can be defended as a
sound policy decision.
The United States took the moral lead in imposing import re-
strictions on pre-Columbian monumental and architectural sculp-
ture and murals. In 1972 there seemed at least a fair chance that this
lead would be followed. So long as there was a chance that the legis-
lation might be effective in helping reduce the destruction of art, the
legislation was worthwhile. This does not mean, however, that the
United States should always take the moral lead in adopting import
restrictions where the stakes are not as high and when the chances of
being followed are even less likely.38
34. 19 C.F.R. § 12.105(a) (1980). The Customs Service apparently selected every Latin
American country which had export restrictions broad enough to-cover pre-Columbian monu-
mental or architectural sculpture or murals. See 38 Fed. Reg. 14,677 (1973) (reason for adding
Honduras to countries covered by the regulations).
35. For example, Panama is covered by the regulations although, so far as the writer
knows, there are no pre-Columbian murals in Panama and relatively few stone monuments,
none of which has excited the cupidity of collectors.
36. 19 C.F.R. § 12.105(b) (1980).
37. See statutory definition at note 32 and accompanying text supra.
38. See notes 173-77 and accompanying text infra.
B. Restrictive Action by the United States Customs Service
The publicity surrounding the pillage of Mayan monuments in
the Pet~n and the subsequent enactment of remedial remedial legis-
lation focused the attention of the United States Customs Service on
the importation of antiquities generally. As a result, in the mid-70's
Customs officials began an effort to deter the importation of antiqui-
ties thought to have been illegally removed from other nations. The
assigned task of the Customs Service, however, is to enforce United
States Customs laws, not the laws of other countries. The Customs
Service is supposed to keep out of the United States those objects
which Congress has indicated should not be imported39 and to make
sure, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1592,40 that those objects which can be
legally imported are correctly identified.
Section 1592 makes it unlawful for any person to import any
merchandise into the United States by means of a "document, writ-
ten or oral statement, or act which is material and false . . .,,"
The statute applies even though a false statement would not result in
any underpayment of duty - as in the case of duty-free items such
as works of art - and covers negligent as well as intentional mis-
statements. Prior to 1978, the prescribed penalties for a violation,
even when the misstatements were merely negligent, were either for-
feiture of the items in question or imposition of a penalty equal to
their full value.42 But administrative procedures existed for mitiga-
tion of the penalties or return of seized merchandise upon payment
of a fine.4 3 These punitive provisions gave customs agents all the
authority they needed to carry out selective restrictions on the im-
portation of art from foreign nations.
The celebrated case of the "Boston Raphael" illustrates the use
39. P. FELLER, U.S. CUSTOMS & INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE, VOL. i, § 3.02 [1]
(1981).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1976).
41. Id at §(a)(I)(A)(i).
42. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, ch. 497, § 592, 46 Stat. 750 (current version at
19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1976)).
43. An amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, enacted on October 3, 1978, considerably
reduced the penalties for nondeliberate misstatement. Act of Oct. 3, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410,
§ 110(a), 92 Stat. 893 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1980)). Generally, the maximum penalty
for .rossly negligent violations of the statute is four times the duty payable, and for simple
negligence, two times. In the case of nondutiable merchandise, such as antiquities, the maxi-
mum penalties are 40% of the value of the merchandise for grossly negligent violations and
20% of the value of the merchandise for merely negligent violations. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(2),
(3) (1980). As revised, the statute also provides that "[c]lerical errors or mistakes of fact" are
not violations of law unless "part of a pattern of negligent conduct." Id § 1592(a)(2). The
maximum penalty for fraudulent misstatements is the value of the merchandise. Id.
§ 1592(c)(1). The statute authorizes seizure of the merchandise, but only where the person
suspected of violating the section is insolvent or outside the United States or where otherwise
necessary "to protect the revenue of the United States." Id. § 1592(c)(5). For a description of
some of the inequities in the earlier version of the statute that the 1978 law was designed to
remedy, see Herzstein, The Need to Reform Section 592 of the TariffCt of 1980, 10 INT. LAW
285 (1976).
of Section 1592 by the Customs Service to achieve a goal other than
the statutory requirement of full disclosure. In 1969 the Boston Mu-
seum of Fine Arts announced a sensational acquisition - the
purchase of a hitherto unknown Raphael" masterpiece, reportedly
for $600,000. Unfortunately, a museum curator had brought the
Raphael out of Italy without the export license required by Italian
law. In addition, the curator had unaccountably failed to declare the
Raphael when he brought it into the United States. This incredible
oversight cost the Museum its painting. Simply put, the Customs
Service took advantage of the infraction of United States law to ne-
gotiate a return of the Raphael to Italy.45
With the case of the Boston Raphael behind it, the Customs
Service launched what some viewed as an "art recovery program."
The opening salvo of the campaign was the seizure in April 1974 of a
shipment of pre-Columbian ceramic figures at JFK Airport in New
York. The seizure was ostensibly justified because an invoice indi-
cated six pre-Columbian classic period ceramic figures, while the
parcel contained not six but seven figures fitting the description in
the invoice.46 The total value of the items was correctly declared and
the items were not subject to duty. The error was patently clerical in
nature. Nevertheless, an attempt to submit a corrected invoice was
rejected, the seizure was publicized, and representatives of ABC tele-
vision were triumphantly invited to film the "recovered" objects.
4 7
On occasion, the Customs Service even seemed to forget that its
authority was constrained by the provisions of Section 1592. In one
case, for example, a Customs agent was reported to have refused to
release from custody some eleven cases of Indian antiquities shipped
into New York, apparently on the ground that the material might
have been illegally exported from India. The items were photo-
graphed, and Customs called on officials from the Indian consulate
in New York to determine whether India wished the items returned.
The material was released only when the Indian Government failed
to respond to Customs' inquiries.48
44. Raphael (1483-1520), one of the masters of the Italian High Renaissance, was both a
painter and an architect. His work is admired for the grandeur of its conception as well as its
suppleness of form and ease of composition.
45. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST supra note 25, at 101-08.
46. This incident was reported to the author by the dealer whose property was seized. It
was also described in G. Glueck, Custons Cracks Down on LootedArt, The New York Times,
July 10, 1974, at 45, col. 3.
47. Reported to the author by the dealer involved in the incident. The film was later
presented as part of a television show entitled "Culture Thieves," leaving viewers with the
unmistakable, but false, impression that the consignee, a distinguished New York dealer, had
been nabbed in a nefarious smuggling scheme. The program was shown beginning at 8:00
p.m. EDT on May 30, 1974. See ABC News Press Release, May 13, 1974, The Mounting
Illegal Traffic in Valuable Objects of Art Investigated in "'BC News Close-up: The Culture
Thieves, "Airing Thursday, May 30.
48. Reported to the author by the dealer involved in the incident. In another incident
This burst of Customs activity aroused consternation among
dealers and collectors. The provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1592, however,
pose no threat to dealers or collectors who are meticulous in describ-
ing imported art. Moreover, most of the incidents of misdescription
were due to overzealousness on the part of a relatively few Customs
agents, and complaints to the Commissioner's office finally put an
end to the problem. Indeed, spokesmen for the Customs Service em-
phatically denied that there was any "art recovery program."49 One
Customs official actually acknowledged that the Customs Service
had no authority to seize or delay the importation of artworks simply
because they had been illegally exported from other countries.50 Im-
plicitly, the Customs Service conceded that United States policy with
respect to the importation of art should not be determined even in
part by the enthusiasms of its agents.
In retrospect, however, it appears that the overzealousness of
the Customs Service may only have been temporarily checked. As
of this writing, at least some Customs agents have seized upon the
decisions in the McClain cases, discussed in the next part of this arti-
cle,as justification for a new round of Customs activity.
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IV. The McClain Cases
A. McClain I
The disclosure of the havoc being visited on Mayan sites in the
Pet~n not only spurred the Customs Service into action but also ap-
pears to have stimulated the ingenuity of the Department of Justice.
Whatever the cause, in June 1975, the Department of Justice ob-
tained the conviction of five defendants in a criminal case in the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas based on a novel
interpretation of the National Stolen Property Act. When the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the prosecution's legal theory
in McClain I,52 it effected a fundamental change in the United States
law with respect to the importation of art.
The activities in McClain revolved around the sale of an assort-
ment of pre-Columbian antiquities, mostly small ceramic objects
and mostly Mexican in origin. One of the defendants, Joseph Rodri-
guez, had loaded the antiquities into a trailer and driven them from
brought to the author's attention, five Roman frescoes were similarly impounded in New York
in October of 1974 and held for a substantial period even though four of the five frescoes had
previously been in the United States and were being returned after exhibition abroad.
49. Interview on July 25, 1974 with John H. Dennis, Director, General Investigations
Division, U.S. Customs Service and Martin White, Chief, Smuggling and Organized Crime
Branch, General Investigations Division, U.S. Customs Service.
50. See exchange of correspondence between James R. McAlee and Fred R. Boyett, Re-
gional Commissioner of Customs, Nov. 14, 1974 and Dec. 2, 1974.
51. See Part IVF infra
52. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
his home in California to Texas, where he had planned to sell them.
Rodriguez' standard selling technique seems to have been to make
random calls to museums and dealers listed in the telephone direc-
tory, and he followed this technique when he arrived in San
Antonio. Sitting in his motel room and thumbing through the yel-
low pages, Rodriguez chanced upon what he thought was a promis-
ing entry - the "Mexican Cultural Institute." Unbeknownst to
Rodriguez, the Mexican Cultural Institute was an educational out-
post of the Mexican Government. The Institute promptly alerted the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 3 John McGauley, an under-
cover agent for the FBI, subsequently managed to gull the luckless
defendants into believing that he was one Joe Dooley and that he
represented a New York syndicate attempting to corner the market
for pre-Columbian art.54 Shortly after the defendants began to talk
price, they were arrested55 and charged with violations of the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act.56 The National Stolen Property Act pro-
hibits the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of any
goods worth $5,000 or more with knowledge that the goods were sto-
len, converted or taken by fraud. 7 The NSPA also levies criminal
sanctions against anyone who receives, sells or disposes of any such
goods knowing that they have been stolen, unlawfully converted or
taken by fraud.5
The key phrase in the statute is "knowing the same to have been
stolen."59 The novelty of the McClain case is that the prosecution
was not based on evidence that the antiquities had been "stolen" in a
conventional sense.60 Rather, the charge was that the antiquities had
53. One of the prospective purchasers that the Institute obligingly sent over to his hotel
room later became a key witness at trial. McClain I, supra note 4, at 662; record in United
States v. Simpson (2d trial) at 443-66.
54. Record in United States v. Simpson (2d trial), at 282, 286.
55. Id at 303-04.
56. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (1976).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976). Specifically, the section prohibits transportation "in inter-
state or foreign commerce [of] any goods, wares, merchandise, securities, or money, of the
value of $5000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud
.... .Id (emphasis added).
58. The statutory language is even more inclusive: "whoever receives, conceals, stores,
barters, sells or disposes of any goods. . . of the value of $5,000 or more. . . moving as, or
which are part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to
have been stolen, unlawfully converted or taken. shall be criminally liable. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2315 (1976) (emphasis added).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
60. The prosecution urged that United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir.
1974), which also involved a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 for dealing in pre-Columbian
art, provided a precedent for the McClain case. The court of appeals concluded that in fact
Hollinshead did support its decision. McClain I at 1001. In Hollinshead, the court concluded
that, on the basis of expert testimony at trial, "artifacts such as Machaquila Stele 2" are "the
property of the [Guatemalan] Republic .. " 495 F.2d at 1155. However, the issue whether
a governmental declaration of ownership was sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act does not appear to have been litigated. Moreover, what may suffice
to establish state ownership of a well-known immovable monumental object such as Macha-
been illegally exported from Mexico and that this illegal exportation
amounted in itself to "stealing," that is, the illegal deprivation of
someone's rights of. ownership. That "someone," according to the
prosecution, was the Mexican Government. Dr. Alejandro Gertz,
deputy attorney general of Mexico, testified that beginning in 1897 a
series of Mexican statutes6' had declared all pre-Columbian arti-
facts, wherever found, to belong to the Mexican nation, with the sole
exception of those exported with the official blessing of the Mexican
Government. He further testified that a search of the pertinent
records indicated that none of the defendants had been given per-
mission to export the objects in question.62 The judge instructed the
jury in accordance with Dr. Gertz' testimony,63 and a guilty verdict
was returned.
The reaction was immediate and heated since the theory
adopted by the trial court cast a cloud on the title of nearly all pre-
Columbian objects in the United States.' "Museum directors, art
dealers and innumerable private collectors throughout this country
must have been in a state of shock when they read the news. . . of
the conviction of the five defendants in this case."65 Indeed, the
quila Stele 2 cannot properly be equated with what is needed to establish state ownership of
previously undiscovered movable objects.
The prosecution also relied on United States v. Plott, 345 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
In Plait, a conviction was upheld under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 for unlawfully transporting in inter-
state commerce alligators that were "poached and otherwise converted in violation of state and
local law." The court broadly interpreted the words "stolen" and "converted" to cover acts
such as poaching in which the taker intends to keep property to which he has no lawful claim,
even if the property taken is not owned by another. Citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,
529 (1896), the court in Plot went on to conclude that in any event the state "owns" wild game
found within its jurisdiction. The Geer case, however, is clearly one of those cases in which the
word "ownership" is used in an almost metaphorical sense to justify state regulation. Cf.
BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY 8 (3d ed. 1975). In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402
(1948), the Supreme Court enunciated this proposition forthrightly: "The whole ownership [of
fish and game] theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal
shorthand of the importance to its people that a state have power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource". In sum, Plott seems to stretch the concept of "stealing"
to the breaking point by equating it with any prohibited taking, and in McClain, the court of
appeals found this reasoning unpersuasive. McClain I at 1002, n.3 1.
61. See Ley Sobre Monumentos Arqueologicos, Diario Oficial de 11 de mayo de 1897
11897 Act (May 11, 1897), Law on Archaeological Monuments]; Ley Sobre Proteccion y Con-
servacion de Monumentos y Bellezas Naturales, 58 Diario Oficial 7, 31 de enero de 1930 [1930
Act (January 31, 1930), Law on the Protection and Conservation of Monuments and Natural
Beauty]; Ley Sobre Proteccion y Conservacion de Monumentos Arqueologicos e Historicos,
Poblaciones Tipicas y Lugares de Belleza Natural, 82 Diario Oficial 152, 19 de enero de 1934
[1934 Act (January 19, 1934), Law for the Protection and Preservation of Archaeological and
Historical Monuments, Typical Towns and Places of Scenic Beauty]; Ley Federal del Pa-
trimonio Cultural de la Nacion, 303 Diario Oficial 8, 16 de diciembre de 1970 [1970 Act (De-
cember 16, 1970), Federal Law Concerning Cultural Patrimony of the Nation]; Ley Federal
Sobre Monumentos y Zonas Arqueologicos, Artisticos e Historicos, 312 Diario Oficial 16, 6 de
mayo de 1972 [1972 Act (May 6, 1972), Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic
Monuments and Zones].
62. McClain I supra note 3, at 992.
63. Id at 994.
64. Id at 992.
65. Id at 991-92.
Council of the American Association of Museums, an organization
then representing 1,248 institutions, issued a blistering statement:
The radical and novel interpretation of a domestic criminal
statute, originally intended to deal with problems of an altogether
different nature, . . . poses particular dangers both to American
museums and to ongoing efforts at international cooperation.
Such an interpretation may not only serve to brand as criminal
those past actions that American museums have taken in good
faith over the past three-quarters of a century but also calls into
question the future ability of such museums to use large portions
of their collections, painstakingly acquired over so many years, for
the educational and research purposes that constitute the very rea-
sons for their being.66
Subsequently, when the case was appealed, the American Asso-
ciation of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art filed a brief
amicus curiae in which it urged rejection of the lower court's posi-
tion. The Association argued that before an article may be regarded
as stolen it must be taken in derogation of "ownership" rights and
that "ownership" implies more than a mere legislative assertion by a
foreign government of national dominion over artworks. Such
claims of national ownership, it was urged, were largely legal ab-
stractions. They were in effect "not much more than a metaphor"
for the police power to regulate the class of property over which
ownership was asserted.67 Accordingly, the amicus contended that
claims by foreign governments to "ownership" of artworks6" could
not determine the issue of "stealing" within the meaning of the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act. This point was underscored by the fact
that a contrary interpretation of the National Stolen Property Act
would override the longstanding policy of the United States to en-
courage the importation of art and antiquities.
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The amicus further urged that to base the meaning of the term
"stolen" as used in the National Stolen Property Act upon the inter-
pretation of foreign law would inject an intolerable uncertainty into
the administration of the statute in the United States. The foreign
statutes were often based on legal concepts alien to Anglo-American
jurisprudence, and were largely unavailable in translation. In the
view of the amicus, the lower court's interpretation of the National
Stolen Property Act would convert the statutes into a trap for the
unwary, violating the fundamental constitutional principle that a
66. Statement of Concern, Council of the American Association of Museums (Jan. 9,
1976 ).
67. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 14, citing BROWN, supra note 60, at 81. See also Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948) (ruling that although South Carolina could lawfully regu-
late shrimp fishing within three miles of its coast, the state did not possess an ownership right
to the shrimp within that area).
68. The claims of "ownership" extended to all antiquities, discovered or undiscovered,
and inprhate hands as well as in government repositories.
69. See discussion in Part II supra.
criminal statute should provide "a fair warning. . . to the world in
language that the common world will understand, of what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed."7°
After considering these and other arguments the court of ap-
peals delivered its opinion on January 24, 1977. It rejected the argu-
ment that a legislative declaration of "ownership" was insufficient to
trigger the criminal provisions of the National Stolen Property Act. 71
"Such a declaration combined with a restriction on exportation with-
out consent of the owner (Mexico) is sufficient to bring the NSPA
into play."' 72 The court based its conclusion on the view that Con-
gress intended a broad construction of the word "stolen," and that
here Mexico "had done all it reasonably could do" to protect its in-
terest in pre-Columbian art.7 3 The court also rejected the contention
that the lower court's views were inconsistent with a long-established
United States policy to encourage the importation of art.7 4
Nevertheless, the court of appeals agreed with the amicus that
an object should not be considered "stolen" merely because it was
illegally exported from a foreign country. In the court's words,
"[a]lthough 'stealing' is not a term of art, it is also not a word bereft
of meaning. '75 Accordingly, the fact that an article was illegally ex-
ported from another country would not be enough to invoke the pro-
visions of the National Stolen Property Act. Instead "a declaration
of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of an
article can be considered theft, and the exported article considered
'stolen' within the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act."76
70. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 16, quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27
(1931).
The Amicus also urged as an independent ground for reversal that the lower court erred in
concluding that since 1897 all pre-Columbian art in Mexico belonged to the Mexican nation.
The brief argued that it was not until 1972 that Mexican law purported to vest "ownership" of
movable pre-Columbian art in the Mexican nation, and that there was no evidence that the
articles in McClain were exported from Mexico after 1972. The court of appeals later accepted
this argument. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text infra,
71. McClain I, supra note 3, at 1001.
72. Id The court's approach has been appropriately criticized for confusing "a violation
of a regulatory aspect of Mexico's laws (the export embargo)" with "theft." Note, Art Theft:
National Stolen Property Act Applied to Nationalized Mexican Pre-Columbian Artfacts, 10 J.
INT'L LAW & POL. 569, 601-02 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Art Theft]. The court held that both
a declaration of ownership, and export restrictions were necessary to bring the National Stolen
Property Act into play. Yet, "[ajccording to the court's own reasoning, export restrictions are
regulations which do not constitute acts of dominion and therefore should be superfluous to
the issue of theft." Id at 601.
73. McClain I, supra note 3, at 994, 1001.
74. Id at 997.
Nor was the court persuaded by the argument that its interpretation would effectually
incorporate into the National Stolen Property Act a multiplicity of difficult, if not incompre-
hensible, foreign enactments. In its view, the "specific scienter requirement" of the Act, elimi-
nated the possibility that a defendant could be convicted for "an offense. he could not have
understood to exist." Id at 1002 n.30. For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see Part
IVC infra.
75. Id at 1002.
76. Id at 1000.
This distinction between property declared to be owned by the
state, and property that is merely subject to export restrictions led to
the reversal of the trial court's decision. The court of appeals sur-
veyed Mexico's successive enactments relating to cultural property"
and concluded that it was not until May 6, 1972 that Mexico unam-
biguously declared that all pre-Columbian art was owned by the
state. Even that declaration was subject to an exception where the
art was already in private hands in accordance with prior law.78
Since the prosecution had failed to present evidence that the defend-
ants removed the antiquities from Mexico after May 6, 1972, the case
was reversed and remanded.79
Although it reversed the case, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's construction of the National Stolen Property Act by
holding that a foreign nation could trigger enforcement of the NSPA
in America by a properly worded legislative enactment in its own
country. It thus jolted museum directors, art dealers and private col-
lectors with a shock at least equal to that which followed the trial
court's decision. The only comfort they could derive from the deci-
sion was that movable pre-Columbian antiquities exported from
Mexico prior to 1972 were now apparently immune from attack.
Even this small measure of comfort would soon dissipate, however,
when the court of appeals subsequently decided AcClain 11.80
B. McClain H
On remand to the district court, the expert witnesses for the
prosecution on Mexican law reasserted their contention that since
1897 Mexican law had vested title to all pre-Columbian antiquities
in the Mexican nation. The trial judge accepted their guidance
rather than that of the court of appeals, and the case was presented
to the jury on the same theory that the court of appeals had just
rejected.8' Predictably, the defendants were once again found guilty.
On appeal the second time, a different panel of the court of ap-
peals agreed that it was bound to follow the earlier court of appeals
decision regarding the construction of the National Stolen Property
77. The court found that the Mexican law of 1897 did indeed declare that "archaeologi-
cal monuments" were the "property of the nation," but defined archaeological monuments to
mean immovable monuments. Moreover, while the succeeding Mexican law of 1930 placed
export restrictions on pre-Columbian art, it also fell short of a declaration of ownership. The
next major Mexican law covering pre-Columbian art was enacted in 1934 and, in the court's
view, declared as property of the state only pre-Columbian archaeological immovables and
those movables found "in or on" the immovable archaeological objects. Id at 998-99. The
same was true of the Mexican law of 1970 with respect to pre-Columbian antiquities. Id at
999-1000.
78. Id at 1000.
79. Id at 1003.
80. McClain II, supra note 4.
81. Id at 668. See notes 60-63, 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
Act.8 2 It concluded, however, that the prior holding was not in-
tended to foreclose expert testimony at the second trial that might
shed light on the meaning of the Mexican statutes. Indeed, backing
away from the position of the panel in the earlier case, the court
observed that "[i]t may well be, as testified so emphatically by most
of the Mexican witnesses, that Mexico has considered itself the own-
er of all pre-Columbian artifacts for almost 100 years." '83 Neverthe-
less, the court went on to conclude that, if Mexico entertained such a
view, it failed to express it in its early statutes "with sufficient clarity
to survive translation into terms understandable by and binding
upon American citizens."8 4 By relying on Mexican statutes ex-
tending back to 1897, the government had based its case in part on
enactments so vague that they could not serve as proper predicates
for prosecution. Thus, the court of appeals once more reversed the
convictions85 insofar as they were based on substantive violations of
the National Stolen Property Act, although this time the court em-
ployed a different rationale than was relied upon in McClain
To museum directors, private collectors and dealers in art, the
most troublesome aspect of the McClain II opinion was an implica-
tion that the court might have reached a different conclusion had the
prosecution tried its case on the theory that the objects were clearly
exported after the date of Mexico's 1934 or 1970 antiquities legisla-
tion.86 The reason for this suggestion was that the 1934 and 1970
82. McClain II, supra note 4, at 664.
83. Id at 670.
84. Id See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
85. The court sustained the convictions for conspiring to violate the National Stolen
Property Act. These convictions were upheld under 18 U.S.C. § 371, which makes it a sepa-
rate, independent crime to conspire to violate a federal law, even if the violation is not con-
summated. The evidence presented to the jury in McClain II clearly established that the
defendants had conspired to smuggle pre-Columbian antiquities from Mexico after the enact-
ment of the 1972 legislation that unambiguously claimed state ownership of all pre-Columbian
antiquities. In addition, the evidence at the second trial was "massive that appellants knew
and deliberately ignored Mexico's post-1972 ownership claims." Id at 671. The fact that the
defendants never succeeded in completing the object of their conspiracy was simply beside the
point.
It is not particularly significant that the second panel of the court of appeals in McClain 11
chose to base its rejection of the pre-1972 Mexican legislation on a theory different from that
followed by the first panel. The second panel understandably preferred not to decide that the
legislation failed to achieve what duly qualified expert witnesses on Mexican law had testified
at two successive trials that the legislation had in fact achieved. Rather, the second panel
preferred the more diplomatic rationale that, whatever was intended by the pre-1972 legisla-
tion, the legislation was vitiated by its vagueness for the purposes of a United States criminal
prosecution. At the same time, the court of appeals made it clear that it believed that the
Mexican experts were reading things into the Mexican statutes that simply were not there.
"The witnesses. . . were unable to identify specific passages . . . in the 1897, 1930, 1934, or
1970 statutes that claimed outright ownership of the sort of movables largely involved in this
case." Id at 667 n.13. See also id at 668 n.14. Once again, the sensitive nature of interna-
tional relations played a role in the application of a United States statute. See notes 34-35 and
accompanying text supra.
86. McClain II, supra note 4, at 662.
statutes assert state ownership as to archaeological immovables8 7
and also provide that a movable pre-Columbian object that is not
"registered" will be presumed to have the same status as an "immov-
able," or will otherwise be presumed to be government property."8
The court avoided ruling on the contention that the application of
these presumptions would offend due process, but it clearly opened
the door to their application in some future proceeding.
The net result of McClain II was the creation of considerable
murkiness as to whether the National Stolen Property Act could be
invoked to cover movable pre-Columbian art that was exported from
Mexico after February 19, 1934, the date of the 1934 Mexican legis-
lation, but before the date of the 1972 enactment. The practical ef-
fect of this uncertainty in future prosecutions, however, depends
largely on the nature of the "specific scienter requirement" referred
to by the court.89
C. The Specjftc Scienter Requirement
1. The Nature of the Requirement. -In McClain I, the court of
appeals noted that its decision meant that similar exportations from
different foreign countries might lead to different results in the
United States depending on the nature of the laws that the foreign
countries had enacted.9' It observed, however, that the National
Stolen Property Act contained a specific scienter requirement, a re-
quirement that the defendant have actual knowledge that goods were
stolen. According to the court, this requirement protected a defend-
ant who might otherwise be trapped by differences in foreign laws.9'
By this reasoning, knowledge that art had been exported in vio-
lation of foreign customs regulations would be insufficient, without
more, to fulfill the scienter requirement. Actual knowledge of a dec-
laration of ownership by a foreign government, such as the type of
knowledge found to exist in McClain HI, would be necessary to sus-
tain a conviction under the National Stolen Property Act.92 This po-
sition is eminently sound. A contrary approach would leave the
courts free to regard a knowledge of export violations as a surrogate
for knowledge of theft, an exercise which is forbidden under the rule
87. See note 77 supra.
88. Ley Sobre Proteccion y Conservacion de Monumentos Arqueologicos e Historicos,
Poblaciones Tipicas y Lugares de Belleza Natural, 82 D.O. ]25, Art. 12 [9] de enero de 1934);
Ley Federal del Patrimonio Cultural de la Nacion, 303 D.O. 8, Art. 55 (16 de diciembre de
1970).
89. See note 74 supra.
90. McClain I at 1001 n.30. The court reached this conclusion in rejecting defendant's
analogy to the rule in Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943), which held that criminal
statutes should not be interpreted according to diverse state laws.
91. Id See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
92. This, at least, is the approach suggested by a fair reading of the court's discussion.
of Morissette v. United States. "
In Morissette, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for theft
where the defendant, a foreign citizen, had appropriated rusted
bomb casings that he believed had been abandoned on government
land. Even though the defendant knew that he was trespassing on
government land, and even though he had no right to appropriate
the casings, the court found that the prosecution had not met the
scienter requirement. The prosecution had not proved that the de-
fendant had the requisite guilty knowledge that he was engaged in
theft, and the court condemned the trial court for drawing a pre-
sumption of guilty knowledge based upon an act of unauthorized
taking.94 Similarly, in a McClain -type case, it would be error to pre-
sume that a defendant knew that he was dealing in "stolen" property
simply because he knew that the property had been brought from a
foreign country in violation of its export restrictions.95
This consideration points up the essentially formalistic basis for
the decision in McClain I that a foreign nation's legislative declara-
tion of. ownership creates a basis for the crime of stealing under
United States law. If a dealer acquires an antiquity in a foreign
country and knowingly violates that country's customs restrictions
by bringing it to the United States, that person cannot be prosecuted
under the NSPA for stealing unless he also knew that the foreign
country had asserted ownership of the class of antiquities that he had
acquired. He might face some faint risk of a civil suit by the foreign
nation,96 but otherwise he would be free to profit from the sale of the
antiquity in the United States. In contrast, another dealer who ille-
gally exported this same type of antiquity would face a conviction if
it could be shown that he had knowledge of the foreign declaration
of ownership.
Furthermore, the result would be the same even if it were shown
that the latter dealer was unaware that a mere governmental fiat
could elevate what he thought of as a customs infringement to the
dignity of theft. In other words, it would be immaterial whether he
regarded his actions as an infraction of customs regulations or as
stealing. On the theory of the McClain cases, he would be guilty of
both.
This disparity in treatment of the two hypothetical dealers may
93. 342 U.S. 246, 271 (1952).
94. Id at 274-75.
95. In Art Th, supra note 72, at 605, it was assumed that the court, in fact, had
committed this error: "the court apparently took the illogical position that
knowledge of a 'wrong' (illegal) export not legally actionable in the United States
satisfies the scienter requirement in this criminal prosecution. This leap of logic is
not based on sound judicial interpretation of the nature of the scienter requirement,
and violates the defendants' right of due process."
96. See Part IVE infra.
be justified, as suggested in McClain , by the dictum that it is not
"unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to
an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross
the line."97 Nevertheless, the disparity underscores the fact that in
McClain I the court of appeals expanded the definition of "stealing"
to create a category of crime in which guilt may turn not so much on
the defendant's action as on the quality of the information at his
disposal.
2 Practical Consequences of the Requirement. -The nature of
the specific scienter requirement also points up the difficulty of ob-
taining convictions under the National Stolen Property Act with re-
spect to movable pre-Columbian antiquities imported prior to the
spate of publicity which in 1975 attended the convictions in McClain
L 98 As it happened, the defendants in the McClain cases possessed
a knowledge of the details of Mexico's 1972 antiquities laws. Prior
to 1975, however, such knowledge was not shared in the United
States by either the ordinary dealer or the sophisticated collector.
The pre-1972 statutes were even less known. So far as the author
97. McClain I supra note 3, at 1002 n.30, quoting Boyce Motor Lines v. United States,
342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952).
98. The government may have been trying to simplify its evidentiary problems when it
recently brought a criminal case based on the McClain theory and charged not only a violation
of the National Stolen Property Act, but also a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545, which provides
criminal sanctions against:
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United States, any
merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facil-
itates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise after importation,
knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary
to law.
18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976) (emphasis added). This statute further provides that: "Proof of defend-
ant's possession of such goods, unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury, shall be deemed
evidence sufficient to authorize convictionfor violation of this section. " Id (emphasis added).
This presumption greatly reduces the prosecution's burden of proof.
The prosecution charged in this case that the defendants had violated 18 U.S.C. § 545
because they had imported pre-Columbian art "contrary to law," i e., contrary to the terms of
the National Stolen Property Act. See United States v. Weiner, No. S-77-339 (E.D. Cal. filed
June 7, 1979). The prosecution thus charged a violation of law based on another violation of
law. Cf. Roseman v. United States, 364 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1966).
One reason for the government's action may have been to try to obtain the benefit of the
presumption, which apparently requires a defendant to come forward with a satisfactory ex-
planation of how he acquired the merchandise, once it is established that the merchandise was
m fact imported into the United States in violation of law. United States v. Meyer, 432 F.2d
1000 (1970).
The problem with any attempt to use the presumption in connection with the National
Stolen Property Act is one of circularity. It is not a violation of the National Stolen Property
Act to bring material into the United States if the importer lacks knowledge that it was "sto-
len." Accordingly, in order to invoke the presumption against an importer, the government
would first have to establish the importer's guilty knowledge. Under such circumstances, the
presumption is useless. On the other hand, the presumption might be of value if the govern-
ment could prove guilty knowledge by an importer, but lacked proof of scienter against a
defendant receiver.
For a discussion of the impetus that this interaction between 18 U.S.C. § 545 and the
McClain holding has given to Customs enforcement activity, see Part IVF infra
knows, the presumptions in the 1934 and 1970 Mexican statutes,
which purportedly convert unregistered "movables" into govern-
ment property, were first brought to light in the United States by the
translations of the Mexican statutes prepared during the course of
McClain L
It is nonetheless possible that convictions will still be obtained
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 for transactions in monumental pre-Co-
lumbian antiquities exported from Mexico before 1972. The pre-
1972 Mexican statutes clearly claim government ownership of im-
movable pre-Columbian art, and the courts might conclude that,
when monumental art or architectural fragments are involved, a
prior claim of national ownership could be inferred from the very
nature of the object. The courts have held that scienter may be
proved by evidence that the defendant inferred from the circum-
stances that an article was stolen.99 Arguably, evidence that defend-
ants drew such an inference would be provided by the nature of the
article itself if it were a monumental object or architectural frag-
ment. The court of appeals in McClain I so implied when, in dis-
cussing the massive pre-Columbian stela involved in another case, it
observed: "Anyone would have known that it was stolen."'"
Anyone would not know from the nature of the objects them-
selves that ceramics or jades or other movable pre-Columbian art
objects were "stolen." On the other hand, collectors, dealers, and
museum officials have now been alerted to the fact that such objects
may be deemed to be stolen under the National Stolen Property Act
if they were exported from Mexico after 1972. The question which
then arises is what if anything should they do if they are interested in
the purchase of an antiquity of apparent or even possible Mexican
origin. The answer is that they would be well advised to make a
reasonable inquiry about the circumstances under which the seller of
the object came into its possession and what, if anything, the seller
knows about the circumstances of its exportation from Mexico.
As the courts have observed, receivers of stolen goods almost
never "know" that goods have been stolen, in the sense that they
could so testify in a courtroom.' 0' Nor do sellers of such property
ordinarily admit to potential purchasers that they are offering stolen
99. United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1947). See note 98 supra.
100. McClain I, supra note 3, at 1001 n.28, referring to United States v. Hollinshead, 495
F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). Nevertheless, anyone visiting the ranches orfincas on the Gulf
Coast of Gualemala will observe pre-Columbian stone monuments, some of substantial size,
casually disposed about courtyards or otherwise employed as garden or yard ornaments in a
way suggesting private rather than national ownership. This is the case even with respect to
such famous sculptures as the monumental tiger of El Baul. Ignacio Bernal remarks: "It
stands today in a qarden behind a caretaker's house, although it would be a major ornament to
any museum." I. BERNAL, THE OLMEC WORLD 179 (1969).
101. United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1947).
wares. 0 2 For that reason, the courts have held that a case brought
under the NSPA may be submitted to a jury when there is evidence
from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the purchaser
believed that the articles he was acquiring were "stolen."'
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In a McClain-type case, this means that dealers, collectors, or
museum officials could be convicted under the NSPA if a jury be-
lieved on the basis of such evidence that they acquired an artwork
knowing that it had been removed from a foreign country in contra-
vention both of export restrictions and that country's declaration of
ownership. Under these circumstances, some reasonable inquiry by
the collector, dealer or museum official is clearly in order.
3. The Problem of After Acquired Knowledge. -The prospec-
tive purchaser who duly inquires about an antiquity proffered for
sale may encounter another problem. What treatment should be ac-
corded to articles that were illegally removed from a foreign country
in the past and then came to rest in the hands of persons who had no
knowledge that they were removed in contravention of that country's
claim to ownership? For example, a collector might have acquired a
pre-Columbian object in 1973 that he knew had recently been
brought from Mexico. Nevertheless, like most collectors at that time,
he might have been ignorant of Mexico's 1972 declaration of owner-
ship. May a museum now safely acquire that object from the collec-
tor, or is the museum curator's present knowledge of the 1972
Mexican law sufficient to taint the purchase and render its acquisi-
tion illegal under the NSPA?
A similar problem arises in connection with a museum's loan of
pre-Columbian objects to an out-of-state museum. If the lending
museum acquired an object in good faith in the past, it may never-
theless be charged that it is illegal to transport the object in interstate
commerce because the museum is now aware that the object was
probably illegally removed from its country of origin in defiance of a
claim of national ownership. Even the applicable five-year statute of
limitations may fail to provide protection."° Since each "transporta-
tion" of the object in interstate commerce could be regarded as a
fresh and separate offense under the NSPA, the lending museum
might run the risk of prosecution if it were to entrust the object to the
stream of interstate commerce even five years after it had originally
acquired it.
Unfortunately, there seems to be little or no case support for the
proposition that objects known to have been stolen may be handled
102. Id
103. Id at 442.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976).
with impunity once they have come to rest in the hands of an inno-
cent purchaser. Considering the policy of the law with respect to
objects stolen in a coventional sense, this is understandable. Indeed,
it is arguable that there is no legitimate reason for a person to deal in
goods that he knows to be stolen except to try to return them to their
rightful owner. 05 But what makes good sense in the case of objects
stolen in a conventional sense, may not be sound policy in the case of
objects "stolen" under the McClain theory. It seems doubtful that
even the government of Mexico would welcome back the innumera-
ble minor ceramics which have flowed from its borders since 1972,
much less since 1970 or 1936. Nevertheless, given the dearth of case
law, attorneys may be reluctant to render an opinion that even a
museum loan across state lines will not trigger the application of the
NSPA. 
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In the end, absent a congressional resolution of the problem,
collectors, dealers and museum personnel will probably have to rely
at least in part on prosecutorial discretion. It seems unlikely, al-
though it is certainly not impossible, that the United States would
attempt to obtain convictions of persons who were not implicated in
illegal exportation, directly or indirectly, either as exporters or im-
porters or knowing receivers of freshly exported art.
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D. Non-Mexican Antiquities
The same problems that surround the acquisition of Mexican
antiquities also surround the acquisition of any art work when there
is reason to believe that the object was illegally removed from its
country of origin in contravention of a national claim of ownership.
The United States has successfully based prosecutions under the
NSPA not only on Mexican law but also on Guatemalan law, '0 8 and
under the same act it has obtained indictments based on the laws of
Costa Rica, Peru, and Panama." Accordingly, the prospective pur-
105. Cf. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 385 n. II (1946).
106. Indeed, to the writer's knowledge, several important loan shows have been cancelled
because of the uncertainty generated by the McClain decisions.
107. In a congressional hearing, Mark B. Feldman, then Deputy Legal Adviser, Depart-
ment of State, stated: "As to criminal law, the correct policy would be to indict individuals
who conspire to steal or distribute stolen objects, not to prosecute museums or other purchasers
of art objects after they come to rest in interstate commerce. Within this framework, a mu-
seum acquiring artworks in good faith should not have any trouble; it is the art dealers who
have cause to worry about the repercussions of the McClain case." Seminar on the Interna-
tional Protection of Cultural Property, April 22, 1977, reprinted in Hearing on HR 5643 and S.
2261 Before the Senate Subcomm on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm& on Finance, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 196, 201 (1978). Unfortunately for collectors and museum curators, Mr. Feldman
does not represent the Department of Justice.
108. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
109. See United States v. Weiner, No. S-77-339, slip op. at I (E.D. Cal., filed June 7,
1979). The court's decision in Weiner involved a motion to dismiss as well as various procedu-
ral motions, and only the Costa Rican law was discussed in any detail. On the basis of the
translation set forth in the decision, Costa Rica has apparently claimed ownership since 1938
chaser of pre-Columbian antiquities should avoid the acquisition of
any objects that he has reason to believe were recently exported from
these countries.
But what specifically should be done by the prospective pur-
chaser of art or antiquities from other countries? Unless a prospec-
tive purchaser is put on notice that the antiquities in question are
covered by a governmental claim of ownership, he need not forego
buying them simply because there is a theoretical possibility that
such a claim exists. Nor does it seem probable that the National
Stolen Property Act would be construed to require that a prospective
purchaser try to obtain legal opinions with respect to the laws of an
antiquity's probable country of origin. An attempt to determine
whether a foreign country had enacted legislation sufficient to trigger
the provisions of the NSPA would be no easy task, to say the least." 10
In many cases it would be necessary for a prospective purchaser to
engage United States counsel, foreign counsel, and probably a trans-
lator. The foreign counsel would have to search for any applicable
law in the supposed county of origin and United States counsel
would have to determine whether the pertinent language amounted
to a claim of ownership sufficient to invoke the theory of the Mc-
Clain case. In light of the obscurity of some of the relevant foreign
statutes,"' the work of counsel would in many instances be time-
consuming, expensive, and probably inconclusive.
E Possible Civil Suits
A further complexity suggested by the McClain cases is the pos-
sibility that foreign nations will bring civil suits to recover objects
"stolen," in the McClain sense, that are now reposing in United
of pre-Columbian antiquities in terms comparable to those of the 1972 Mexican enactment
considered in the McClain cases. Id at 8-10.
In an internal advisory memorandum, the Customs Service's Office of Regional Counsel
in San Francisco concluded that Costa Rican, Panamanian and Peruvian law vested owner-
ship of antiquities in the government. Regional Counsel reached a contrary conclusion with
respect to the laws of Columbia, El Salvador and Honduras, although the memorandum stated
in each case that "an argument might be made" or "an argument might possibly be made" that
illegally exported antiquities "in effect" were the property of the nation. See Advisory Memo-
randum, Office of the Regional Counsel, San Francisco, California, on Pre-Columbian Arti-
facts - Violations and Restrictions Involving Importation 5-13 (Nov. 15, 1977).
110. For example, if one were to peruse Bonnie Burnham's book, The Protection of Cul-
tural Property, which compiles foreign laws protecting art and antiquities, one would find an
abstract of the Mexican law of 1972. B. BURNHAM, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROP-
ERTY 112-13 (1974). From this abstract, however, one would not be able to determine that
Mexico had vested "ownership" of pre-Columbian antiquities in the state. Id
111. See, e.g., the law of Afghanistan as summarized in BURNHAM,: "All antiquities,
known or concealed, including those in private possession, are under the protection and sur-
veillance of the state, and are registered on an official inventory." Id at 29. The law of Hun-
gary is similar: "All kinds of materials, documents and monuments are considered museum
pieces, if they are of outstanding importance.. . . All museum pieces, whether in public or
private possession, are registered on an official inventory and are protected by the state." Id
at 88-89.
States museums or in the hands of dealers or collectors. Most state
laws provide that the owner of a stolen object may recover it from a
subsequent purchaser even if that purchaser was bona fide,' t2 and
had no reason to suspect that the object was in fact stolen. Thus, a
plaintiff suing in replevin" I3 would not confront the burden of prov-
ing scienter that faces a prosecutor in a criminal case." 4 Accord-
ingly, after McClain, a foreign nation may be tempted to try to
reclaim art objects outside its borders by the replevin mechanism.
The rationale would be that objects covered by a legislative declara-
tion of national ownership, and thus "stolen" within the meaning of
the NSPA, are also "stolen" within the meaning of state statutes or
decisional law relating to the return of stolen property.
The same defenses could be raised in any such suit for replevin
as were raised unsuccessfully in McClain I. It could be argued that
state statutes and common-law concepts relating to stolen property
were not intended to dispossess purchasers of objects deemed to be
"stolen" only in the sense that a foreign nation purported to vest
itself with ownership by legislative declaration." 5 Moreover, it
could be urged that the liberal construction of "stealing" provided
by the court in McClain I was made possible by the scienter require-
ment contained in the NSPA. It is only the scienter requirement, it
could be argued, that prevents an injustice from arising from what is
in essence a radically new interpretation of the word "stolen" as used
in that Act."l6 This impediment to injustice would be removed if
civil statutes relating to conversion and replevin were given a simi-
larly elastic reading.' 17
Whatever the merits of such suits for replevin, it seems doubtful
112. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403. The Code adopts the common-law rule that the possessor
of stolen goods has a "void" title and does not have power to transfer a good title.
113. Replevin is a personal action brought to recover possession of goods unlawfully
taken, rather than to recover their monetary value. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1463-64 (4th ed. 1968).
114. See O'Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
115. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra.
116. See note 74 and IVC(l) supra.
117. Replevin suits could also be defended on the ground, if available, that the relevant
statute of limitations had expired. There may, however, be difficulties with this defense. For
example, in New York the statute of limitations may not begin to run against a bona fide
purchaser until a demand has been made against him by the true owner. See Menzel v. List,
267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966). (Painting stolen in 1941 and purchased by defendant in
1955 was recovered by the plaintiff in 1966.); Kunstsummlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicojbn, slip op.
at 47-51 (E.D.N.Y., filed June 15, 1981) (painting stolen in 1945 and purchased by defendant
in 1948, awarded to plaintiff in 1981). This seems to be a perverse application of a rule origi-
nally designed to protect a bona fide purchaser from being labelled a converter, and being
made liable for the value of stolen goods, by requiring that demand be made on him as a
condition to suit. See GUllet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28 (1874).
At least one eminent New York practitioner has suggested that the reasoning of Menzel v.
List is in error and that, in New York, the statute of limitations may well begin to run not from
the demand, but from the time when the owner was entitled to make the demand. See H.
Hirsch, Lecture to the Bar Association of the City of New York 17 (Dec. 12, 1979), citing
Federal Ins. Co. v. Fries, 355 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1974). The Fries case also held that the statute of
that - except in extraordinary cases - foreign nations will have
recourse to the uncertainties of litigation to try to recover art deemed
"stolen" under the theory of the McClain cases. On the other hand,
the Government of Mexico is in a position under certain circum-
stances to call upon the United States Attorney General to sue on its
behalf to recover stolen property. Presumably, Mexico would invoke
this right to try to recover antiquities of major importance exported
in defiance of its claims of ownership.
Under a 1970 treaty between Mexico and the United States"1 8
each nation agreed to "employ the legal means at its disposal to re-
cover and return from its territory stolen archeological, historical
and cultural properties"119 removed from the territory of the other
after the effective date of the treaty, March 24, 1971. The treaty de-
fines "archeological, historical and cultural properties" to include
"art objects and artifacts of the pre-Columbian cultures of the
United States of America and the United Mexican States of out-
standing importance to the national patrimony . . 20
Requests for the recovery and return of stolen property are
"made through diplomatic offices."'' If the nation receiving the re-
quest cannot return the stolen property, it is obliged to institute judi-
cial proceedings for recovery. To this end, the Attorney General of
the United States is specifically authorized to institute proceedings in
the United States District Courts on behalf of the Mexican Govern-
ment. Although the treaty stipulates that it is not intended to alter
domestic laws applicable to stolen property,122 the State Department
limitations began running when the owner in theory had the right to make a demand, even
though he was ignorant of that right.
In other jurisdictions, the period of the statute of limitations starts afresh each time a
"stolen" object is resold to a new purchaser. See, e.g., Culp v. Signal Van & Storage, 298 P.2d
162 (Cal. Super. Ct., App. Dep't. 1956). Other courts have blended the issue of the running of
the statute of limitations with the issue of adverse possession. See Henderson v. First Nat'l
Bank of DeWitt, 251 Ark. 427, 494 S.W.2d 452 (1973). Because the unpublicized private pos-
session of an object is not the type of "open and notorious" possession sufficient to put an
original owner on notice of an adverse claim, (See San Francisco Credit Clearing House v.
Wells, 239 P. 319 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1925)), when a statute of limitations defense can be established
only by evidence of adverse possession, the defense is subject to an exception for even the most
innocent concealment. For a full discussion of these issues see Comment, The Recovery of
Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statutes, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1122
(1981).
118. "Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexi-
can States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and
Cultural Property," July 17, 1970 [19711 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088. This is the only
treaty of this nature presently in force, although the United States entered a somewhat similar
executive agreement with Peru in September 1981. See note 130 infra.
119. Id at Art. III, 1.
120. Id at Art. I, 11 (a).
121. Id at Art. III, 2.
122. Id at Art. III, 3. It appears that only one action to recover pre-Columbian art has
been brought under the treaty. The United States Attorney who initiated the action is said to
have dropped the case because of the Mexican Government's lack of cooperation. Hirsch,
supra note 117, at 8. On the other hand, there have been several recent instances in which
Mexican consular officials, who have observed pre-Columbian antiquities for sale in the
and the Attorney General presumably will place the same expansive
gloss upon the word "stolen" in the treaty as applied by the court of
appeals in the McClain cases.
F Renewed Customs Activity
An unexpected side-effect of the McClain decision has been a
new burst of Customs activity restricting art imports. One reason is
that 18 U.S.C. § 545, a law enforced by Customs, provides criminal
penalties for "fraudulently or knowingly" importing into the United
States any merchandise "contrary to law. .."23 There is authority
to the effect that a violation of the NSPA in turn gives rise to a viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 545, that is, property brought into the United
States in violation of the NSPA is property "imported" contrary to
law."1
24
Several regional counsel for the Customs Service have taken the
position that Customs should seize antiquities 25 when it has reason
to believe that they have been exported from countries that have en-
acted statutes similar to those of Mexico, even though Customs has
no evidence that the importer has the guilty knowledge requisite to a
violation of the NSPA and, in turn, requisite to a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 545. The question of scienter is left as an element to be
explored at leisure in the investigation which follows a seizure. 1
26
Moreover, in one instance, the Customs Service has "detained"
ancient Peruvian pots and other antiquities alleged to have been ex-
ported in contravention of a legislative claim of ownership, even
though it was apparently satisfied that the importer had no knowl-
edge of the legislation in question. 27 Customs based its authority
United States, have complained to the FBI of alleged violations of the treaty and have actually
managed to provoke FBI inquiries into the supposed violations. The Mexican officials, of
course, misconstrued the treaty, which is to be invoked through diplomatic channels to recover
property agreed to be of outstanding importance to Mexico's cultural patrimony.
Ironically, in this same treaty, Mexico agreed "to permit legitimate international com-
merce in art objects" consistent with its laws and regulations "assuring the conservation of
national archaeological, historical and cultural properties." Art. II, 1. So far as this commit-
ment of the treaty covers pre-Columbian art, it is a dead letter, since Mexico has not in any
instance relaxed its ban on the exportation of pre-Columbian antiquities. Indeed, Mexico ap-
parently takes the extraordinary position that every single pre-Columbian artifact is of out-
standing importance to Mexico's cultural patrimony and is thus covered by its treaty with the
United States. See Hirsch, supra note 117, at 8. It can be assumed, however, that the State
Department, through which diplomatic requests are made, will not raise this issue if it receives
a request for United States assistance under the treaty.
123. See note 98 supra.
124. Id
125. Customs may seize property when it has reason to believe that a law which it enforces
has been violated. See 19 C.F.R. § 162.21 (1979).
126. Telephone conversation with Ms. Mary Grumbine, Regional Counsel, United States
Customs Service (April 6, 1981).
127. Interview on June 16, 1981 with Robert H. Abbey, General Counsel of the United
States Customs Service and Stuart P. Seidel, Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement and
Operations.
for the detention on 19 U.S.C. § 1499, which provides that:
[i]mported merchandise, required by law or regulations made in
pursuance thereof to be inspected, examined or appraised, shall
not be delivered from customs custody, except under such bond or
other security as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury. . . until it has been inspected, examined or appraised and is
reported by the appropriate customs officer to have been truly and
correctly invoiced and found to comply with the requirements of
the laws of the United States.'
28
According to the Customs Service, it has traditionally taken the
position that, under Section 1499, it has implied authority to detain
evidence of a crime. It also asserts that stolen property is evidence of
a crime, even though the crime may not be that of the importer. 129
The basis for Customs' authority to detain the antiquities is ten-
uous to say the least. Nevertheless, purporting to act under § 1499,
Customs held the antiquities for two-and-a-half months and then, in
June, 1981, filed an interpleader action in federal court in which it
joined Peru and the importer as defendants and, in effect, asked the
court to determine who was entitled to the antiquities. 130  Both the
importer and Peru proceeded to file claims of ownership.
These actions by the Customs Service have had the effect, in at
least one port, of putting an abrupt end to the importation of ancient
art from a number of Latin American countries. If this Customs ac-
tivity spreads, the result will be a ban on the importation of art from
all countries that enact statutes similar to those of Mexico. In the
long run, one of the most significant aspects of the McClain cases
may well be the spawning of a Customs' embargo.
V. Need for a Legislative Solution
The McClain cases not only created widespread confusion in
the art community, but also represented an intrusion by the courts
into a type of policymaking that is best left to Congress. The cases
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1976).
129. Interview, supra note 127.
130. United States v. Pre-Columbian Artifacts, Peru, and David Goldfarb, 81-1320-Civ-JE
(S.D. Fla. filed June 18, 1981). On September 14, 1981, the United States signed an executive
agreement with Peru, in which it agreed that it would "employ the legal means at its disposal
to recover and return from its territory stolen archaeological, historical and cultural properties
that have been removed from the territory of the requesting Party." Agreement between the
United States of America and the Republic of Peru for the Recovery and Return of Stolen
Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, art. II, par. 2. The quoted language is the
same as that employed in the 1970 treaty between Mexico and the United States. See note 118
and accompanying text supra. This agreement may provide Customs with a much sounder
basis for detaining Peruvian antiquities than it has had in the past. However, the use of execu-
tive agreements to impose customs barriers seems to be an "end-run" by the State Department
around Congressional resistance to State Department-sponsored drafts of legislation to imple-
ment the UNESCO Convention. See Part VIB infra. Because of the advance time required
for printing of the law review, it has not been possible to discuss this important development in
any greater detail.
leave no room for debate within the United States on whether cer-
tain classes of art should be banned from this country. Rather, the
opinions delegate that decision to foreign governments. As time
passes, it can be expected that more and more nations, alert to the
possibilities opened by the McClain decisions, will enact statutes
containing the requisite language to trigger the application of the
NSPA.'
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Some of these nations will undoubtedly be prompted to enact
this legislation by a desire to help stop the despoliation of their cul-
tural heritage. On the other hand, some governments object to a
draining away of primitive art not because of an interest in preserv-
ing it but because they want to share in what has become a lucrative
trade in ethnological objects.'32 Still other nations officially ban the
exportation of their antiquities, but unofficially promote the com-
mercial exportation of these same antiquities with considerable
vigor. 33 Finally, other nations may be prompted to follow the lead
of Mexico simply by the type of cultural jingoism which Professor
Merryman observes we should not be terribly interested in protect-
ing. 134 Nevertheless, as things now stand, the decision that the ex-
port restrictions of these nations will be backed by the criminal
sanctions of the National Stolen Property Act and policed by the
United States Customs Service does not rest in the discretion of the
United States Government, but depends upon the type of verbal
131. In so doing, there is no reason to believe that art-exporting nations will limit them-
selves to declarations of ownership covering ancient art. For example, if a nation wishes to
buttress its export restrictions on Renaissance and Baroque paintings and sculpture, it would
have the option of adopting a declaration of national ownership. Properly drafted, such a
declaration might well have its desired effect under United States law without seriously dis-
rupting private ownership rights within the declarant nation.
132. B. BURNHAM, THE ART CRISIS 131 (1975) (citing instances of some African govern-
ments seeking to profit from the trade in native art).
133. Id at 154-57. Is a nation's failure to enforce its antiquities law a defense in a prose-
cution based on the McClain theory? In United States v. Weiner, No. S-77-339, slip. op. at II
(E.D. Cal., filed June 7, 1979), the court rejected as a basis for dismissal the assertion that
Costa Rica failed to enforce its law on pre-Columbian art, noting that the "only support for
that bald statement is apparently that a few shopkeepers in Costa Rica told an investigator that
the law was not enforced." If a failure to enforce could be demonstrated, however, it might be
argued that the foreign country had in effect tacitly abandoned its claim of ownership. This
type of probing into the affairs of other countries may offend traditional notions of comity, but
it may be necessary when foreign laws are made the basis for criminal actions in the United
States. Cf. United States v. Molt, 452 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1978), granting in part a motion
to dismiss an indictment for illegally importing reptiles into the United States in violation of
the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43. The court dismissed the indictment insofar as it was based on
the violation of export restrictions in Fiji and Papua New Guinea because the court was not
convinced that the purpose of the restrictions was the preservation of wildlife as opposed to the
raising of revenues.
134. Merryman, The Protection ofPatrimony, in DUBOFF, supra note 20, at 255, 256. Cf.
Macrory, 7he Pre-Columbian Art Caper, 4 DIST. LAWYER 19, 23 (1977):
Many authorities feel that a total ban on exportation of art is a retrograde step, that
leads to problems worse than those it cures. . . . Yet the McClain case makes no
distinction between overbroad declarations of national ownership in cultural prop-
erty which have such undesirable effects, and more narrowly drawn measures,
designed to protect only objects of significance to the national heritage.
formula contained in the legislation that these nations choose to en-
act.
The folly of permitting foreign nations to dictate the application
of United States criminal law and the imposition of United States
customs restrictions is underscored by the circumstances surround-
ing the 1980 acquisition of important pre-Columbian antiquities by
Melbourne Australia's National Gallery of Victoria.' 3 5 These antiq-
uities were exported from Mexico after the enactment of its antiqui-
ties legislation in 1972 declaring national ownership of pre-
Columbian artifacts. According to the reports of visitors, the collec-
tion is comprised of monumental stone carvings of outstanding im-
portance, including a large fragment of a Mayan stela from the
Yucatan, a Toltec "Chacmool" from Tula, and an Aztec stone carv-
ing of the jaguar god said to weigh over a ton. Nevertheless, the
Austrialian museum was able to acquire the imprimatur of the Mexi-
can Government on its acquisition of this collection.'3 6 It seems
anomolous that a museum in the United States, which cannot expect
similar largess from the Mexican government, would be able to ac-
quire similarly freshly exported antiquities of much less significance
only if its director and trustees were brash enough to risk criminal
prosecution under United States law.
The truth is that in the MeClain cases the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit handed art-exporting nations something of a "blank
check" to create crimes in the United States. It has thus achieved a
result that the United States opposed 37 in the deliberations that gave
rise to the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Cultural Prop-
erty.' 38  Under the initial draft of that treaty, signatory nations
135. See $2 Million Mexican Gifi to Victorian Art Gallery, The Australian Financial Re-
view, July 4, 1980, at 4; Putting Australia's Tax Incentive To Work, The Art Newsletter, Nov.
I1, 1980, at 5.
136. The National Gallery of Victoria states that the collection was cleared by Mexican
customs officials before it left Mexico. Letter to James R. McAlee from Judith Ryan, Assistant
Curator of Tribal Art at the National Gallery of Victoria (Jan. 23, 1981). This exportation
would presumably have had to be cleared by the President of Mexico in order to be legal
under the 1972 Act. See Ley Federal Sobre Monumentos y Zonas Arqueologicos, Artisticos e
Historicos, 312 D.O. 16 (6 de Mayo de 1972). ("The exportation of archaeological monuments
is prohibited, except for exchanges or gifts to foreign Governments or Scientific Institutes by
agreement of the President of the Republic."). Whatever the case, it appears clear that the
Government of Mexico has acquiesced in the exportation to Australia of an extensive collec-
tion of pre-Columbian art, including major monumental stone pieces. This is the same Mexi-
can Government which has yet to permit any legal exportation of antiquities to the United
States and takes the position under its treaty with the United States that every pre-Columbian
potsherd is of outstanding importance to the national partrimony. See note 122, supra.
137. Rogers & Cohen, Art Pillage - International Solutions in DuBoff, supra note 20, at
315 & 317; Note, The Legal Response to the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 5 LAw &
POL. INT'L Bus. 932, 957-62 (1973).
138. See note 6 supra.
UNESCO was established in 1946 by a conference for the establishment of an educa-
tional, scientific, and cultural organization of the United Nations. Its purpose is to contribute
would have committed themselves to make it illegal under their own
law to import all art-works exported without an export certificate
from the territory of another party to the Convention. The United
States vigorously resisted this draft.'39
United States representatives reasoned that the United States
should not undertake to enforce exportation schemes, "without some
assurance that the contents of those schemes will be responsive to the
values which favor as well as those which disfavor the movement of
art across boundaries."'" These values include the desirability of
fostering in the citizens of all nations an appreciation of the art and
culture of other countries,'' as well as their own heritage.
These considerations underscore the desirability of a legislative
solution to the problems generated by the McClain cases.' 62 The dif-
ficulty is that any legislative solution would probably be opposed by
archaeological and other groups unless it established some mecha-
nism in lieu of the McClain theory for curbing the importation of art
and antiquities, because in their view such importation poses a dan-
ger to the preservation of archaeological sites. The problems en-
countered in trying to forge this type of legislative mechanism are
illuminated by the history of the unsuccessful attempts to implement
the UNESCO Convention.
to educational, scientific and cultural progress, and to encourage international cooperation in
these fields. UNESCO is administered through a General Conference Executive Board and a
secretariat. Major projects focus on exchange of information between member states and ac-
tivities dealing with specific problems in particular states. See generally, Office of Public Infor-
mation, EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONs 488-97 (1964).
139. The essential architecture of the draft Convention is that a signatory country is
bound to prohibit the importation into its own territory of "cultural property" ex-
ported in violation of the exporting country's standards, no matter what the content
of those standards and regulations. This, to most of the panel, gave a blank check to
the exporting countries.
Letter to Miss Annis Sandvos, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of
State, from William D. Rogers on behalf of the Panel on the International Movement of Na-
tional Art Treasures of the American Society of International Law (Nov. 26, 1969) (the State
Department had delivered the initial draft to the Society for evaluation).
140. Preliminary Draft Memorandum, submitted by the Reporter to the Panel of the
American Society of International Law on the International Movement of National Art
Treasures 59-60 (Oct. 10, 1969).
141. Id at 18.
142. The Metropolitan Museum of Art has urged that the proposed legislation to imple-
ment the UNESCO Convention, discussed below, should include a provision overriding the
Mc~lain cases as well as preempting state laws that might otherwise compel the return of
archaeological or ethnological material deemed "stolen" under the theory of the McGlain
cases. See Hearings on H 5643 Before the Subcomm on Trade of the House Comm on Ways
and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) (statement of Douglas Dillon). The State Depart-
ment has not embraced the proposal.
VI. The UNESCO Convention and Proposed
Implementing Legislation
A. The Convention
The UNESCO Convention represents a compromise between
the competing interests of art importing and art exporting nations.
As indicated above, the United States resisted the blanket export and
import controls called for by the initial draft of the Convention. As
a substitute, it proposed an alternate draft that provided for: first, a
ban on acquisitions of property by museums and other institutions
under state rather than private control if the property is "suspected
• . . of being obtained from illicit activities"; second, mutual assist-
ance in identification of cultural property; and last, a "crisis" provi-
sion authorizing controls on an ad hoc basis when a state's cultural
heritage "is jeopardized by the removal from the national territory of
items of cultural property of great importance to the national patri-
mony." 1
4 3
The American proposals served as the model for the final draft
of the Convention.' 44 Article 6(a) of the Convention provides for a
prohibition on imports in the case of property "stolen from a mu-
seum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institu-
tion," and Article 9 is a "crisis" provision similar to that in the
alternate draft submitted by the United States. Article 9 declares
that a "state whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of
archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon" other par-
ties to the Convention "to participate in a concerted international
effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures,
including the control of exports and imports and international com-
merce in the specific materials concerned."'
' 45
The Convention, as thus drafted, faced no opposition in the
United States Senate. It was duly ratified on August 11, 1972, with-
out a single "nay" vote being cast.' The UNESCO Convention, is
not self-executing, however, and it requires the enactment of legisla-
tion to implement its terms.' 47 Although the State Department has
repeatedly attempted to obtain enactment of the necessary imple-
menting legislation, it has repeatedly failed. Opponents of the bill
charge that the version sponsored by the State Department is "far
more sweeping than anything needed to fulfill the letter and the
spirit of the UNESCO Convention."
'1 4 1
143. Note, supra note 137, at 958.
144. Rogers & Cohen, supra note 137, at 318.
145. UNESCO Convention, Art. 6(a) & 9, supra note 6, at 291.
146. 118 Cong. Rec. 27925 (1972).
147. Id
148. See Written Comments on HA 14171, Subcomm, on Trade of the House Comm on
B. Proposed Implementing Legislation
The first State Department Draft of implementing legislation
was sent to Congress in June 1973, but was not acted upon. 49 After
some revisions, the Department submitted a new text to Congress in
July 1975. Congress again declined to act. 5° From 1977 to 1979,
successive drafts of the legislation also died in committee.' 5 ' Yet an-
other bill was introduced in the Senate this year.
15 2
Each proposed version of the implementing legislation has fol-
lowed the exact terms of the Convention in regard to the ban on
importation into the United States of property stolen from a reli-
gious or other secular public monument or similar institution of any
state signatory to the Convention. 53 This provision has not been
controversial. The controversy has centered on a provision which,
although purportedly designed to implement Article 9 of the Con-
vention, 54 nevertheless departs from its terms. The bill proposes
that, after making specified findings, the President may agree bilater-
ally, apart from any concerted international action, to impose import
restrictions on archaeological or ethnological material from another
nation that is a party to the Convention. 55 The import restrictions
as set forth in the successive drafts of the implementing legislation
provide that no archaeological or ethnological material that is ex-
ported from that foreign nation after the effective date of the regula-
tion listing such material may be imported into the United States
unless the foreign nation issues a "certification or other document"
Ways and Mean, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976) (Statement of the American Association of
Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art).
149. See Statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State,
Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means on H.R.
3403 (Sept. 27, 1979).
150. Id
15 1. In 1977, the State Department introduced another new draft of the legislation, this
time under the sponsorship of Congressman Abner Mikva, and in April 1977 hearings were
held on this proposal before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways
and Means. The bill was reported out favorably and was passed by the House in October
1977. Thereafter, in February 1978, the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate
Finance Committee held hearings on the bill. See Hearing on H.R. 5643 and S, 2261 Before the
Subcomm. on International Trade ofthe Senate Comm on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
The Senate Subcommittee failed to report out the bill, and the State Department was once
more compelled to introduce new legislation. Hearings were held on that bill before the House
Subcommittee on Trade in September 1979, but again the bill was not reported out.
152. S. 426, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (legislative date set at January 5, 1981). This bill
was sponsored by Senators Matsunaga and Baucus and has been referred to the Senate Fi-
nance Committee, but comments on the new bill have not yet been solicited. Accordingly, it is
not known whether or not the bill will be supported by the Reagan administration. On Octo-
ber 7, 1981, Senator Matsunaga introduced a revision of this bill which gives effect to a
number of the criticisms directed against prior versions of the legislation. S. 1723 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981). Due to the advance time required for printing the law review, it has not been
possible to discuss S. 1723 in this article, and references in the text to the latest drafts of the
implementing legislation do not take S. 1723 into account.
153. See, e.g., S. 426, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1981).
154. See note 145 and accompanying text supra.
155. See, e.g., S. 426, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981).
representing that such exportation was not in violation of the laws of
the signatory.
156
These two provisions of the legislation have remained constants,
but other provisions have changed or have been added over the
years.157 When UNESCO's reputation became tarnished, the imple-
menting legislation shed its title as a bill to "implement the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Conven-
tion . . . .158 There were other changes also. The findings to be
entered by the President have from time to time been altered, and
more recent versions of the bill have provided for a Cultural Prop-
erty Advisory Committee to submit a report on each agreement pro-
posed by the President. 59 The President shall "consider" the report
before entering into any agreement and imposing any import restric-
tions. 160
C Problems with the Proposed Implementing Legislation
These changes have not succeeded in disarming the opponents
of the bill. Critics contend that the legislation is not limited to "cri-
sis" or "emergency" situations as contemplated by the UNESCO
Convention itself.'6 ' True, the latest drafts of the implementing leg-
islation require findings by the President that "the cultural patri-
156. See, e.g., id at § 6.
157. For example, the import restrictions now provide that the Customs Service shall not
release any designated archaeological or ethnological material unless the consignee presents
the requisite certificate of the country of origin, shows that the material was exported before
the date of the listing regulation, or shows that the material was exported from its country of
origin ten or more years prior thereto and was subsequently held as noted below. Id at 6(b).
The rationale for the ten-year exception was that the importation into the United States of
material which had left its country of origin for that period of time "would no longer serve to
deter pillage and would unnecessarily deny access to the American viewing public." H.R.
Rep. No. 95-615, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1977). The State Department, however, pro-
ceeded to vitiate this so-called "detoxification" provision by insisting that the consignee prove
not only that the exportation occurred ten or more years prior to the date of entry but also that
(i) during that period the country of origin received or should have received fair notice of the
location of the material by means of exhibition, publication or other circumstances occurring
after its exportation, and (ii) that no United States citizen or permanent resident of the United
States contracted for or acquired an interest, directly or indirectly, in such material during the
ten-year period preceding the date of entry. Professor Bator of the Harvard Law School has
called the provision as it now stands "absurdly complicated and needlessly harsh." Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 18 (1979) (Statement of Paul M. Bator). In practical effect, the burden imposed on the
consignee nullifies the exception.
158. Compare S. 2677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) with S. 426, supra note 152.
159. See, e.g., S. 426, supra note 152 at § 5. A provision for the "emergency implementa-
tion" of import restrictions was added at the same time as the provision establishing the Cul-
tural Property Advisory Committee. Id at § 3. This provides that under certain
circumstances the President may impose import restrictions without considering the views and
recommendations of the Committee, unless the Committee's report is submitted within 60 days
from the date it was first supplied with the facts prompting the restrictions. The emergency
implementation of the import restrictions is to last no more than two years. Id at § 3(c)(3).
160. See, e.g., id at§2.
161. See Statement of the American Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and
Primitive Art, supra note 148, at 21-22.
mony of the State Party is in jeopardy from the pillage of
archaeological or ethnological materials. . ." and that "the applica-
tion of the import restrictions would be of substantial benefit in de-
terring a serious situation of pillage . .. 162 Nevertheless, words
are flexible in their meaning, and one man's routine digging may be
another man's plunder.
63
The draft legislation provides noobjective check on the exercise
of discretion by the executive branch. There can be no assurance
that, in evaluating requests for import restrictions, the executive
branch, acting through the State Department or the International
Communications Agency, 16 would not be guided more by United
States interests unrelated to art than by the considerations which
gave rise to the UNESCO Convention. 65
Moreover, even the State Department concedes that "there will
be pressures to extend the embargo granted to one country to an-
other country's goods."' 66 Once the United States has agreed to bar
importations from one nation, it may be diplomatically unable to
refuse similar concessions to other nations. The United States finds
it awkward to discriminate between foreign nations when applying
the terms of legislation in which those nations may have an inter-
162. S. 426, supra note 152 at § 2.
163. The fear that the proposed legislation, if enacted, might be used to shut off the impor-
tation of antiquities in less than critical situations is not groundless. Some of the proponents of
the implementing legislation place great stress on the loss of archaeological context of objects
"unprofessionally recovered" and clearly find commerce in such objects repugnant. See, e.g.,
letter of C. Greenewalt, Jr., in Written Comments, supra note 148, at 30; Statement of Charles
Cleland, Hearing on HRA 5643 and S. 2261, supra note 151, at 161. Moreover, the proposed
implementing legislation covers ethnological objects as well as archaeological objects, and eth-
nological objects are not looted or plundered in any ordinary sense. In the case of ethnological
objects, the complaint is simply that undeveloped nations are losing articles sold by villagers or
others which they would prefer were garnered for their own museums. See id at 144-45
(Statement of William Davenport).
164. This agency was formed in 1977 through a consolidation of functions previously ex-
ercised by the U.S. Information Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Educational
and Cultural Affairs. See REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 2 OF 1977, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 95-243, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This
agency will apparently sponsor any future versions of the proposed implementing legislation
introduced on behalf of the administration. If the implementing legislation were enacted,
however, it is not clear whether the President would delegate his powers under it to this agency
or to the State Department.
165. The State Department's principal spokesman on the implementing legislation, Mark
B. Feldman, has stated:
[Tihe Government is not and should not be immune to pressures relating to other
important United States interests. Our relations with various countries are a tapestry
of many interests. For example, we have an agreement with Mexico for the recipro-
cal recovery of stolen automobiles. Back in 1969, Mexico told us in fairly blunt terms
that a similar arrangement should be considered for cultural materials, or they might
not be able to continue their law enforcement cooperation.
Proceedings of the Panel on the U.S. Enabling Legilation of the UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property, 4 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 133
(1976).
166. Id at 134.
est. 167 The nature of the diplomatic process, coupled with the broad
authority which the legislation seeks to vest in the executive branch,
almost seems to preclude a selective use of the power to ban imports
contained in the proposed implementing legislation.
The absence of restrictions on the discretion of the executive
branch has been criticized by such disinterested observers as Profes-
sor James A. R. Nafzinger168 of the University of Oregon and Pro-
fessor Paul M. Bator of the Harvard Law School. Professor Bator is
a proponent of legislation to implement the UNESCO Convention,
but he strongly urged in Senate hearings in 1978 that "import con-
trols should be imposed only in emergency situations."'' 69 He added:
Do these provisions [of Section 21170 paint an adequate pic-
ture that import restrictions are to be imposed only in cases of a
critical threat to important cultural values? I'm concerned that, in
view of some unfortunate language in the House Ways and Means
Committee Report, 17 1 there will be a tendency to equate every
situation of widespread pot hunting with a situation of"jeopardy"
to some country's artistic patrimony.1
72
Opposition to the State Department's version of implementing
legislation has also focused on the fact that the proposed legislation
"creates obligations for the United States which. . . far exceed any-
thing required by the Convention."' 173 Article 9 of the Convention
calls for action by the United States only if there is a "concerted
international effort" to help deter pillage in another country, but the
proposed implementing legislation dispenses with this condition.
167. See notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text supra.
168. Proceedings of the Panel, supra note 165, at 105.
169. Hearings on H. 5643 and S. 2261 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate
Comnt on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1978) (Memorandum by Paul M. Bator).
170. Under Section 2 of the proposed implementing legislation the President may adopt
import barriers only if he finds that "the cultural patrimony" of another state "is in jeopardy
from the pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials... " He must also find that the
adoption of such barriers would be of "substantial benefit in deterring a serious situation of
pillage" and that remedies "less drastic" than import barriers are "not available" S. 426, supra
note 152, at § 2.
171. Professor Bator was referring to the HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT
ON IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVENTION ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, H.R. 5643, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. 6 (1978), in which it was stated: "Your committee did not accept the view advanced by
the dealers in ancient art that exercise of the Section 2 agreement authority should be limited
only to exceptional cases of an extraordinary and critical nature or of crisis proportions."
Professor Bator also expressed concern at language in the House Report, id at 6, which
stated that the embargo authority is "to be resorted to only if other, less drastic alternatives are
not available to the United States to remedy the situation." He asked: "Why 'to the United
States'? The language [of the proposed legislation] should be read to allow import bars only
where less drastic alternatives are not available through action by others (including the export-
ing country) as well as the United States .. " (emphasis in original). Memorandum, supra
note 169, at 192 n.3. Professor Bator's concern is particularly well taken in view of the fact that
the primary market for a foreign nation's antiquities may be the foreign nation itself. In 1972,
it was estimated that about half the pre-Columbian material of prime quality then being un-
earthed was sold to collectors in the country of origin. MEYER, THE MAYA CRISIS, supra note
25, at 16.
172. Memorandum, supra note 169, at 192 (footnotes omitted).
173. Id at 193.
Professor Bator supports implementing legislation even absent a
requirement for "concerted international action,"' 7 4 but others have
adopted a contrary position. The United States is the only major
art-importing nation that has indicated an interest in implementing
the Convention.' Accordingly, it was vigorously argued before
both the House and the Senate that, if the United States acts alone in
imposing import restrictions, "it will not put an end to world trade in
the art which it embargoes but will succeed only in rerouting the
flow of such art from the United States to such countries as Switzer-
land, West Germany, England, France and Japan." It would thus
"penalize the museum-going public without at the same time making
any meaningful contribution to the preservation of art elsewhere." 76
Professor Bator's response is that Article 9 "would remain a
dead letter if it could operate only where there exists a 'concerted
international effort.'" He reasons that "important art importing
countries other than the United States (e.g., Switzerland, Japan, En-
gland) are simply not interested in import barriers and will not join
in a concerted effort."' If Professor Bator is correct, the United
States faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if the United States acts
alone, our actions will be ineffective and the objectives of the
UNESCO Convention will not be attained. On the other hand, if we
do not act alone, and demand concerted international action, our
demand will similarly be ineffective and the objectives of the
UNESCO Convention will similarly not be attained.
Whether Professor Bator is right or wrong, it seems inappropri-
ate to attempt to implement the UNESCO Convention by action that
is not called for by the Convention and that the Convention implic-
itly recognizes as doomed to failure. The United States should im-
plement the Convention in accordance with its terms and use its best
174. Id
175. As of February 10, 1981, the signatories were Ecuador, Bulgaria, Nigeria, the Central
African Republic, Cameroon, Kuwait, Democratic Kampuchae, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Niger,
Libya, Argentina, Iraq, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Panama, the German Demo-
cratic Republic, Poland, Jordan, Zaire, Algeria, Iran, Syria, Tunisia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia,
Boliva, India, Czechoslovakia, Nicaragua, Qatar, Mauritania, Tanzania, Uruguay, El Salva-
dor, Mauritius, Canada, Oman, Italy, Hungary, Guinea, Honduras, Peru, and Cuba. Letter to
James R. McAlee from Herschelle S. Challenor, Senior Liaison Officer, Washington Office of
UNESCO (Feb. 10, 1981); telephone conversation with Ms. Regina Bouchard-Kern, Washing-
ton office of UNESCO (July 9, 1981). Of these signatories, the only country which could even
remotely be considered as an art-importing country is Canada.
176. Statement of the American Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive
Art, supra note 148 at 20.
177. Memorandum, supra note 169, at 193. In a recent statement, Professor Bator has
modified his position. He now suggests that "the willingness of the United States to exercise
leadership - to go first with a self-denying ordinance - may have a profound effect on the
position and attitude of other art-importing countries." Statement of Paul Bator, supra note
157, at 18 (emphasis added). Realistically, however, other art-importing nations are more apt
to follow United States leadership if we try vigorously to enlist their assistance in a multina-
tional, concerted effort to save genuinely endangered antiquities rather than if we simply serve
as an exemplar of self-sacrifice.
efforts to obtain the support of other major art-importing nations in
critical situations of pillage. This effort may not be completely effec-
tive, but it is the best bet to avoid in the future the type of situation
that occurred in the Pet~n.
VII. Conclusion
Changing attitudes toward the importation of art into the
United States have resulted in legislative, regulatory, and judicial re-
sponses in the United States that are in some sense inconsistent. The
Pre-Columbian Monuments Act was a measured, limited response to
the devastation of Mayan sites which, though perhaps implemented
with undue zeal, was nevertheless a sensible attempt to help remedy
a major problem. In contrast, the mid-1970 attempts by the Customs
Service to employ its powers to curb art imports can only be re-
garded as an ill-advised regulatory caper.
The response of the courts has also contrasted sharply with that
of Congress. The broad holdings of the AcClain cases are at odds
with the precision reflected in the Pre-Columbian Monuments Act
and reflect an intrusion into a type of policymaking that is properly
left to Congress. If these cases stand, the determination of what art
may be brought into the United States will not rest in the discretion
of the United States Government but will depend on the verbal for-
mulas employed in foreign legislation.
Unfortunately, it will not be easy to cure the problems raised by
the M&cClain cases. The controversy that has surrounded the State
Department's attempts to implement the UNESCO Conventions,
and the State Department's past unwillingness to enter into any com-
promise which would reduce the wide discretion that it seeks, illus-
trate the problems that impede such a legislative solution.
Nevertheless, unless these problems can be resolved, the policy of
the United States with respect to the importation of art will remain
dictated by these cases. It will thus reflect less the interests of the
United States than the craft of foreign draftsmen and will neither
serve the values that favor the movement of art across state bounda-
ries nor provide any meaningful contribution to the preservation of
art or archaeological monuments.

